CHEVRON CORPORATION | Shareowners Right to Call Special Meeting at CHEVRON CORPORATION

Status
Withdrawn
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Resolution details
Company ticker
CVX
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Energy
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
RESOLVED: Chevron Corporation stockholders request that the Board of Directors give holders of 10% of outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareowners meeting, by taking the steps needed to amend Company bylaws and related governing documents. As fully as permitted, such bylaw shall not contain exceptions or excluding conditions that apply to shareowners but not to the management or Board.
Supporting statement
"SUPPORTING STATEMENT
Management’s handling of a range of issues has increased both risk and cost to shareholders, which necessitates the protective response of reducing the threshold to call a special meeting.
A recent report, Chevron’s Global Destruction,1 documents legal actions filed against Chevron and its subsidiaries globally. It provides evidence that Chevron is liable for $55 billion in judgments and seizure claims globally, including interest. This report was the focus of a U.S. House Oversight Committee hearing entitled: Fueling the Climate Crisis: Exposing Big Oil’s Disinformation Campaign to Prevent Climate Action.
Perhaps the largest of these issues is the ongoing effort by Ecuadorian communities to enforce a $9.5 billion judgment against Chevron for devastating oil pollution (the “Judgment”).
Chevron claims “several international courts have determined the Ecuadorian Judgment to be fraudulent.” However, the only trial court to review the merits of the evidence was Ecuador’s, and the only appellate courts to review the evidence de novo also ruled for the Ecuadorians. Decisions from Brazil and Argentina were made on procedural grounds only, and did not find the Judgment fraudulent. A non-court private investor arbitration panel that determined fraud is suspect because the Ecuadorians were neither a party to the proceeding nor allowed to present evidence.
In contrast, Chevron’s principal witness in a RICO trial was Alberto Guerra, who later recanted key testimony and admitted:
(a)  That he received nearly $500,000 in cumulative payments from Chevron; and
(b)  That Chevron’s law firm – Gibson Dunn & Crutcher – coached him more than 50 times before he delivered his false testimony. CEO/board chair Michael Wirth has not responded to the House Oversight Committee’s question whether he had approved this use of shareholder funds to obtain false testimony.
Mr. Wirth’s statements regarding the Judgment were challenged in the House Oversight hearings referenced above, where it was learned that Wirth had told shareholders “[there is] no scientific evidence of contamination.” In subsequent questioning, Wirth was formally asked: “[if there is] no scientific evidence... why did [the Company] spend $40 million to... remediate?” Wirth remained silent, and also refused to answer questions on how much money has been spent on litigation and PR regarding the Ecuador matter.
Though the Ecuadorian Judgment continues to represent a serious liability, it is only the most striking of numerous examples of ineffectual oversight.
THEREFORE: Because these matters evidence systemic errors in prudence, as well as accountability gaps in Chevron’s C-suite, shareholders need the enhanced protections a 10% special meeting threshold can provide.
Please vote FOR this Special Meeting proposal."

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