Whereas: This single unified policy shall prohibit hedging transactions for shares subject to this policy which are not sales but reduce the risk of loss to the executive. Otherwise our directors might be able to avoid the impact of this proposal. This policy shall supplement any other share ownership requirements that have been established for senior executives, and should be implemented without violating current company contractual obligations or the terms of any current pay or benefit plan. The Board is encouraged to obtain waivers of any current pay or benefit plan for senior executives that might delay implementation of this proposal.
Requiring senior executives to hold a significant portion of stock obtained through executive pay plans would focus our executives on our companyÕs long-term success. A Conference Board Task Force report stated that hold-to-retirement requirements give executives Òan ever-growing incentive to focus on long-term stock price performance.Ó
This proposal topic is all the more important at Duke Energy due to the recent lackluster stock performance. Duke Energy
stock has fallen from $105 to $90 in the 10-months after January 2023. Plus Duke Energy price appreciation is not rated good for the next 3-years.
A more rigorous NEO stock retention plan could ultimately improve shareholder value significantly for years into the future.
This proposal is an additional step in improving the corporate governance of Duke Energy.
Duke Energy shareholders took another step toward Duke Energy improving corporate governance in giving 79% support to the 2023 shareholder proposal calling for a simple majority voting standard as opposed to 80% voting standards?Ð?absurd when only 65% of Duke shares typically vote.
The next step is for Duke management to put the simple majority vote topic on the ballot for this annual meeting and then obtain an 80% vote from all Duke shares outstanding.
If improved corporate governance increases the market capitalization of Duke by one-fourth of 1% it will result in a $175 million increase in the market capitalization of Duke.
If Duke management spends the lowest possible 6-figure sum to encourage more shareholders to vote in order to obtain the required 80%-approval from all shares outstanding, it would result in an astounding $1750 return for each $1 invested. Does Duke management have another suggestion for a potential $1750 return for each $1 invested?