MCDONALD'S CORPORATION | Re-elect Chris Kempczinski as Director at MCDONALD'S CORPORATION

Status
Filed
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
1
Resolution details
Company ticker
MCD
Resolution ask
Other ask
ESG theme
  • Social
ESG sub-theme
  • Public health
Type of vote
Director vote
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Consumer Discretionary
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholder Commons (“TSC”) urges you to vote “AGAINST” Board Chair Chris Kempczinski (Item 1g on the proxy), due to the failure of McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s” or the “Company”) to comply with World Health Organization guidelines designed to reduce antimicrobial resistance.
Supporting statement
Shareholder Commons (“TSC”) urges you to vote “AGAINST” Board Chair Chris Kempczinski (Item 1g on the proxy), due to the failure of McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s” or the “Company”) to comply with World Health Organization guidelines designed to reduce antimicrobial resistance.

TSC is a non-profit organization that addresses social and environmental issues from the perspective of shareholders who diversify their investments to optimize risk and return. More specifically, TSC addresses the interests of diversified shareholders in optimizing overall market returns.

We support a vote AGAINST Chris Kempczinski because the Company’s current standards for antibiotic use do not adequately account for the risks antibiotics in its supply chains pose to public health and the resulting costs to its diversified shareholders.Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is poised to cost the global economy $100 trillion by 2050. Overuse of antibiotics in meat supply chains can thus materially reduce the intrinsic value of the global economy, which in turn harms investment portfolios, as we explain further in Section B. McDonald’s is the single largest beef purchaser in the United States and one of the largest in the world and a major buyer of pork; its policies thus have tremendous influence on the market as a whole. McDonald’s fails to comply with World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines on antimicrobials use in food-producing animals, contrary to its own diversified shareholders’ interests. A vote against Board Chair Chris Kempczinski is thus warranted.

Investors have been asking McDonald’s for many years to improve its AMR stewardship practices. TSC filed shareholder proposals at McDonald’s in 2024 and 2023 asking the Company to comply with WHO Guidelines on Use of Medically Important Antimicrobials in Food-Producing Animals (“WHO Guidelines”)1 throughout its supply chains, and filed a proposal in 2021 requesting disclosure on its AMR practices. Other shareholders have filed similar proposals requesting improved AMR prevention practices.


McDonald’s opposition to the 2024 AMR proposal missed the mark on multiple grounds:


1. McDonald’s said the Proposal was “unnecessary,” but antimicrobial resistance (“AMR”) is increasing at an alarming clip, creating expanding economic damage and consequent threat to the value of diversified portfolios, and the Company’s policies and performance still do not sufficiently mitigate the risk to its diversified shareholders.
2. McDonald’s said the Proposal was “duplicative” of its policies. This wasn’t true. The Company’s existing policies fall well short of the WHO Guidelines. Further, the Company has a history of failure to deliver on its own commitments.
3. McDonald’s said the Proposal “would not provide meaningful benefit to shareholders.” This ignored the reality that the vast majority of investors are everyday savers such as Texas teachers, Detroit fire fighters, and other working people who count on their savings and pensions for a dignified retirement. For them, the single greatest determinant of portfolio value is broad economic health, and AMR is poised to cost the economy $100 trillion by 2050.

Given McDonald’s history of failure to address its contribution to AMR and to meet its own commitments on the topic, a vote against its board chair is in investors’ best interest.

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