ELI LILLY AND COMPANY | Independent Board Chair at Eli Lilly And Company

Status
36.27% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
7
Resolution details
Company ticker
LLY
Lead filer
Undisclosed filer
Resolution ask
Amend board structure
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • CEO / chair duality
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Health Care
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders request the Board of Directors adopt as policy (the "Policy"), and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require henceforth that the Chair of the Board of Directors, whenever possible, be an independent member of the board. The Policy shall apply prospectively so as not to violate any contractual obligations. If the board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, the board shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of the policy within a reasonable amount of time. Compliance with this policy is waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair. This policy would be phased in for the next CEO transition.
Supporting statement
In 2018, the Minnesota Attorney General sued three makers of synthetic insulin, including Lilly, alleging that the companies' publication of "deceptive and misleading" list prices for insulin violates federal and state law. According to the complaint, substantial list price increases for insulin have imposed financial burdens on patients because list prices are used to determine the amount some patients and institutional purchasers must pay. Congressional hearings have been held on the rising cost of insulin, and media attention continues to focus on the effects of high insulin prices, including patient deaths.

The risk of lawsuits, sustained public controversy and regulatory intervention, whether ultimately found to be justified or not, are strong arguments for the need for continuous, effective and unconflicted board oversight of corporate management. The board is responsible for this oversight, but conflicts of interest may arise when one person holds both the Chair and CEO positions. In our view, shareholders are best served by an independent board Chair who can provide a balance of power between the CEO and the board. We believe that Lilly's board should adopt best practice governance policies, including having an independent board chair.

We believe:
- The role of the CEO and management is to run the company;
- The role of the board is to provide independent oversight of management and the CEO;
- There is an inherent conflict of interest when the same person occupies both the role of CEO and Chair.

According to PWC's 2019 survey of over 700 directors, 57% of directors surveyed who sit on a board with a combined Chair/CEO say it is difficult to voice dissent-a 37% higher result than on boards with an independent Chair.

33% of companies in the S&P 500 have an independent Chair. Numerous institutional investors recommend such a move. For example, California's Retirement System CalPERS' Principles & Guidelines encourage separation, even with a lead director in place. The Council of Institutional Investors' corporate governance policies favor independent board chairs.

In order to ensure that our board can provide rigorous oversight for our Company and management with greater independence and accountability, we urge a vote FOR this shareholder proposal.

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation name Declared voting intentions Rationale
Aktia Bank p.l.c. For Shareholders would benefit from the most robust form of independent oversight, in the form of an independent chair.
Pathfinder Asset Management For An independent chair is better able to oversee the executives of a company and set a pro-shareholder agenda
Universities Superannuation Scheme - USS For USS strongly supports the appointment of an independent Chairman.

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