Statoil, in the following consistently referred to as Equinor, was founded in 1972 to take care of Norwegian
interests after oil was discovered on the Norwegian continental shelf in 1969. It had already been
established by law that the Norwegian state had the proprietary rights to the petroleum resources, and it
was therefore important that new discoveries were managed in the best way possible for the Norwegian
society. It was also important to develop petroleum engineering capabilities in Norwegian trade and
industry to support of the petroleum activities. These decisions were undoubtedly correct, although it may
be discussed whether the efforts to ensure a “Norwegian content” may have gone too far.
The internationalization of Equinor’s petroleum activities in the 1990s was a natural further step as the
operations on the Norwegian continental shelf matured. Equinor could thus acquire knowledge for the NCS,
and, not least, use its own experience from Norway overseas.
Equinor was up until 2002 a wholly state-owned private limited company, and today the state still owns
approx. 70% of the company. This means that the Norwegian state takes most of the risk associated with
the company’s investments, both abroad and in Norway. However, one might indeed question whether it is
appropriate that the Norwegian state should be accountable for extensive, risky investments overseas.
Even investments in the petroleum business, which Equinor should have thorough knowledge of, are risky.
The best evidence of this is Equinor’s investments in the US and Canada, which today have accounting
losses totaling more than NOK 200 billion. Added to this are considerable losses (but also profits) in other
parts of the world.
On one of the first pages of the last annual report it is stated that “We are an international energy company
committed to playing a leading role in the energy transition – providing for continued value creation
in a net-zero future.” Equinor is, however, still largely an oil company, and the whole profit in 2020 was
generated by operations on the Norwegian continental shelf.
Business projects other than petroleum are still so small that it in 2020 they were included in the group
“Other”, posting a loss of almost NOK 1 billion.
On Equinor’s website it is stated that “Equinor is in a unique position to make a difference in the global
energy future. We will seize this opportunity.” This is an opportunity that the Equinor management aims
to seize through risky investments, mainly overseas, and by means of assets that largely belong to the
Norwegian state. Such investments are not a major task for the Norwegian state, and the owner is not able
to assess the appropriateness of such investments.